Appendix
Data from Euro area countries
Saving rates over the wealth distribution (Q5 = 100)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (visiting SAFE)
Goethe University Finance Brown Bag
Frankfurt am Main, 18 November 2026
Mortgage debt repayments are a large fraction of household saving flows
Mortgages often mandate fixed repayment schedules e.g. annuity loans Amortizing vs. IO
New homeowners are highly constrained: hand-to-mouth, high debt and expected income growth
This paper: fixed repayments increase overall saving (\(\downarrow C\)), but crowd out liquid saving
Paper fits in literature modelling life-cycle and welfare effects of mortgage structure
Boar et al. (2022), Backman et al. (2025), Balke et al. (2024), Boutros et al. (2025), Ferreira et al. (2024), Gete & Zecchetto (2018, 2024), Greenwald et al. (2018), Karlman et al. (2021), Vestman (2018)
Utility from non‐housing consumption only (\(H\) fixed):
\[ U(c_{t}) = \frac{c_{t}^{\,1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} \]
The household solves, choosing consumption \(c_t\) and repayment \(d_t\):
\[ V(t, s_t) = \max_{\{c_k, d_k\}_{k=t}^{T}} \; \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{k=t}^{T-1} \beta^{k-t} \frac{c_k^{1 - \gamma}}{1 - \gamma} + \beta^{T - t} B(a_T - m_T) \right], \; \textrm{s.t.} \]
\[ \begin{aligned} a_{t+1} &= (1 + r)\bigl[a_t + y_t - (r + s)m_t - d_t - \tau_t - c_t\bigr], \\ \quad m_{t+1} &= m_t - d_t \\ \tau_t &= \tau \cdot \max\{0, d_t^* - d_t\}, \quad a_t \ge \theta^a, \quad m_t \ge 0, \quad d_t \ge 0 \end{aligned} \]
| Time of purchase | Pre-2013 | Post-2013 |
|---|---|---|
| LTV at origination | 1.05 | 1.00 |
| Liquid wealth / income | -0.13 | 0.31 |
| Age at purchase | 32.14 | 32.95 |
| House price / income | 4.63 | 3.59 |
| Mortgage interest rate (%) | 4.56 | 2.36 |
| High education (%) | 69.15 | 73.59 |
| \(\beta\) | 0.987 | Annual patience |
| \(b_0\) | 3.9 | Value of liquid wealth post-retirement |
| \(\tau^{pre}\) | 0.01 | Cost of delayed repayment pre-policy (small) |
| \(\tau^{post}\) | 0.665 | Large penalty post-policy |
\(\Delta\tau \approx 0.66\): effect of policy restricting repayment flexibility
Costly deferral Flexible repayment
| Outcome | Flexible repayment | Costly underpayment |
|---|---|---|
| Mean liquid wealth / annual income | 24% | 19% |
| Hand-to-mouth share | 4% | 19% |
| Simulated buyers | Median loss |
|---|---|
| All buyers | 2.41% |
| Lower education | 2.82% |
| Higher education | 2.13% |
Costly deferral Flexible repayment
Thank you!
Reach out: luistelesm.github.io | luis.teles.m@novasbe.pt
Percentage of obs. where amortization is less than 5% of the regular payment:
| NL | others | |
|---|---|---|
| Mortgages before 2013 | 30.1 | 1.7 |
| Mortgages on or after 2013 | 11.8 | 1.0 |
Inelastic labor supply yields earnings \(Y_{t} = \Gamma_{t}Z_{t}\,\theta_{t}\), as standard (Carroll & Samwick, 1997)
Basic principle uses stochastic gradient descent to find parameters of neural network that solve for the optimal policy function.
Mortgage amortization & wealth accumulation in 2015 by first-time homeowners buying a house in 2012-13 Back to main